Hostname: page-component-74656f9884-g96k6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-10T09:42:12.556Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Discovery and Ampliative Inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

James Blachowicz
James Blachowicz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An inference to a new explanation may be both logically non-ampliative and epistemically ampliative. Included among the premises of the latter form is the explanandum—a unique premise which is capable of embodying what we do not know about the matter in question, as well as legitimate aspects of what we do know. This double status points to a resolution of the Meno paradox. Ampliative inference of this sort, it is argued, has much in common with Nickles' idea of discoverability and, together with the mapping and correction procedures (briefly summarized) required for such inference, may suggest a broadening of the concept of justification which would incorporate much of what has been defended in theories of discovery.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 56 , Issue 3 , September 1989 , pp. 438 - 462
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

†

I am indebted to Thomas Nickles for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

Achinstein, P. (1970), “Inference to Scientific Laws”, in R. H. Stuewer (ed.), Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 5. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 87–111.Google Scholar
Achinstein, P. (1971), Law and Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ashby, W. R. (1956), An Introduction to Cybernetics. London: Chapman & Hall. Republished by John Wiley & Sons (New York), Science Editions, 1963.10.5962/bhl.title.5851CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ashby, W. R. (1960), Design for a Brain. London: Chapman & Hall.10.1007/978-94-015-1320-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blachowicz, J. (1987), “Discovery as Correction”, Synthese 71: 235–321.10.1007/BF00485631CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brown, H. I. (1983), “Assimilation and Discovery”, New Ideas in Psychology 1: 89–97.10.1016/0732-118X(83)90001-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, D. T. (1974a), “Evolutionary Epistemology”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, vol. 14 of The Library of Living Philosophers. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, pp. 413–463.Google Scholar
Campbell, D. T. (1974b), “Unjustified Variation and Selective Retention in Scientific Discovery”, in F. S. Ayala and T. Dobzhansky (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Biology. London: Macmillan, pp. 139–161.10.1007/978-1-349-01892-5_9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gutting, G. (1980), “The Logic of Invention”, in T. Nickles (ed.) (1980a), pp. 221–234.10.1007/978-94-009-8986-3_9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hanson, N. R. (1958), Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Harman, G. (1965), “The Inference to the Best Explanation”, Philosophical Review 64: 88–95.10.2307/2183532CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lakatos, I. (1970), “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91–196.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (1973), “Peirce and the Trivialization of the Self-Corrective Thesis”, in R. Giere and R. Westfall (eds.), Foundations of Scientific Method in the 19th Century. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, pp. 275–306. Reprinted in L. Laudan (1980), Science and Hypothesis. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 226–251.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (1980), “Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned?”, in T. Nickles (ed.) (1980a), pp. 173–183.10.1007/978-94-009-8986-3_6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nickles, T. (ed.) (1980a), Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 56. Dordrecht: Reidel.10.1007/978-94-009-8986-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nickles, T. (ed.) (1980b), “Introductory Essay: Scientific Discovery and the Future of Philosophy of Science”, in T. Nickles (ed.) (1980a), pp. 1–59.10.1007/978-94-009-8986-3_1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nickles, T. (ed.) (1980c), “Can Scientific Constraints Be Violated Rationally?”, in T. Nickles (ed.) (1980a), pp. 285–315.10.1007/978-94-009-8986-3_13CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nickles, T. (ed.) (1981), “What Is a Problem That We May Solve It?”, Synthese 47: 85–118.10.1007/BF01064267CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nickles, T. (ed.) (1985), “Beyond Divorce: Current Status of the Discovery Debate”, Philosophy of Science 52: 177–206.10.1086/289239CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Petrie, H. G. (1981), The Dilemma of Inquiry and Learning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Popper, K. (1974), “Reply to My Critics: 23. Campbell on the Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper. The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 14. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, pp. 1059–1065.Google Scholar
Simon, H. A. (1973), “Does Scientific Discovery Have a Logic?”, Philosophy of Science 40: 471–480. Reprinted in H. A. Simon, Models of Discovery. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 54. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 326–337.10.1086/288559CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simon, H. A. (1976), “Discussion: The Meno Paradox”, Philosophy of Science 43: 147–151. Reprinted in H. A. Simon, Models of Discovery, R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky (eds.), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 54. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 338–341.10.1086/288674CrossRefGoogle Scholar