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Discussion on the D-Thesis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

J. W. Swanson*
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts

Extract

Reanimated for the contemporary literature in the writings of Quine ([15]), [16]) and Kuhn [7], the conventionalism of Duhem [2] and Poincaré [12] has emerged in the last few years as one of the genuinely interesting topics in the philosophy of science. The theory in question—let us follow Grünbaum [3] in calling it the D-thesis, after its founder, Pierre Duhem—claims three things: (1) a single scientific hypothesis H is never disconfirmable in isolation from its fellow; (2) every single hypothesis H of science presupposes, explicitly or implicitly, the support of a conjunction A = A, • A2 • … • Am of auxiliary assumptions or hypotheses; (3) the failure of an observational consequence of H in face of contradictory evidence disconfirms only the conjunction of H and A, not H alone—i.e. establishes only ∼ (H • A). The logical picture is as follows:

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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