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Discussion: Wright on Teleological Descriptions of Goal-Directed Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Lowell Nissen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Arkansas

Abstract

Larry Wright's analysis of teleological description of goal-directed behavior, though ingenious and insightful, errs in the following ways: it incorrectly claims that intentional human action exhibits consequence-etiology, making it impossible, contrary to his claim, for reference to consequence-etiology to be metaphorically transmitted to teleological descriptions of nonhuman behavior; it does not remove the threat of reverse causation for nonhuman behavior; it assumes in the face of contrary evidence that reference to purpose drops out in metaphorical extension; and it cannot account for unrequired behavior directed toward impossible goals.

Information

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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