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The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Michael A. Bishop*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Iowa State University
Stephen P. Stich*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University

Abstract

The flight to reference is a widely-used strategy for resolving philosophical issues. The three steps in a flight to reference argument are: (1) offer a substantive account of the reference relation, (2) argue that a particular expression refers (or does not refer), and (3) draw a philosophical conclusion about something other than reference, like truth or ontology. It is our contention that whenever the flight to reference strategy is invoked, there is a crucial step that is left undefended, and that without a defense of this step, the flight to reference is a fatally flawed strategy; it cannot succeed in resolving philosophical issues. In this paper we begin by setting out the flight to reference strategy and explaining what is wrong with arguments that invoke the strategy. We then illustrate the problem by considering arguments for and against eliminative materialism. In the final section we argue that much the same problem undermines Philip Kitcher's attempt to defend scientific realism.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1998

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