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The Imagery Debate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Kim Sterelny*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park

Abstract

One central debate in cognitive science is over imagery. Do images constitute, or constitute evidence for, a distinctive, depictive form of mental representation? The most sophisticated advocacy of this view has been developed by Kosslyn and his coworkers. This paper focuses on his position and argues (i) that though Kosslyn has not developed a satisfactory account of depiction, there is nothing in principle unintelligible about the idea of depictive neural representation, but (ii) Kosslyn's model of imagery rescues the intelligibility of pictorialism at the cost of its explanatory power.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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