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Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Kevin T. Kelly*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University
Oliver Schulte*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta
Cory Juhl*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Texas, Austin
*
‡Send reprint requests to the senior author, Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213; e-mail kk3n@andrew.cmu.edu

Abstract

This paper places formal learning theory in a broader philosophical context and provides a glimpse of what the philosophy of induction looks like from a learning-theoretic point of view. Formal learning theory is compared with other standard approaches to the philosophy of induction. Thereafter, we present some results and examples indicating its unique character and philosophical interest, with special attention to its unified perspective on inductive uncertainty and uncomputability.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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