Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T05:51:16.566Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Limits of Physicalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patricia A. Ross*
Affiliation:
Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science and Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota

Abstract

Mark Wilson, in his 1985 paper entitled “What Is This Thing Called ‘Pain‘?: The Philosophy of Science Behind the Contemporary Debate,” proposed an account of physicalism that departs significantly from standard approaches. One of the main points of his paper was to explain the flaws in arguments claiming that psychological properties cannot be shown to be physical because of their functional nature. However, the positive proposal that Wilson makes in this article bears further examination. I argue that it not only resolves many problems that have grown up around the topic of physicalism, but that the proposal itself should make us radically rethink some important philosophical questions, especially those concerning explanation and property identification.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable