¹ Mind, 67, 1958

² Ibid., p. 163

³ Which n-adic concept the names are made to satisfy is, of course, as philosophers use the term, a matter of convention.

⁴ One is reminded of the peculiar objects which, according to Frege, one talks about when one attempts to talk about concepts.

⁵ I shall subsequently discuss the dangers involved in the use of color examples with particular reference to the interpretation of color words as names.

⁶ The philosopher I have in mind is Professor Gustav Bergmann and the views I am discussing are those to be found, I believe, in certain passages of his interesting paper on “Ineffability, Ontology and Method” which appeared in the January 1960 number of the Philosophical Review.

⁷ Cf. Bergmann, op. cit., p. 23, n. 2.

⁸ I use this way of putting the matter to make the point with minimum fuss and feathers. It is worth reflecting, however, that the grammatical parallel to ‘a exemplifies green’ would be either ‘a exemplifies being below b’ or ‘a and b jointly exemplify below-ness (the relation of one thing being below another).’

⁹ Strictly speaking, there would be a relation of exemplification for each order of fact, and, on non-elementaristic views, a family of such relations for each type.

¹⁰ See f.n. 9.

¹¹ When he adds that “I can think of this space as empty, but not of the thing without the space,” he suggests the intriguing possibility that we can make sense of the idea that the language we use might have had no application.

¹² Whether these sets constitute embracing sets of primitive predicates of different orders, or whether they fall into subsets (families of determinates) is a topic for separate investigation.

¹³ I find here the implication that primitive one-place predicates (configurations) — if not all primitive predicates — come in families (determinates) and that objects are of different logical form if, for example, one exists in the logical space of color, the other in the logical space of sound.