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On Projecting Grue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

John Moreland
John Moreland*
Affiliation:
Augustana College, Rock Island, Illinois
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Abstract

This paper attempts to place Goodman's “New Riddle of Induction” within the context of a subjectivist understanding of inductive logic. It will be argued that predicates such as ‘grue’ cannot be denied projectible status in any a priori way, but must be considered in the context of a situation of inductive support. In particular, it will be argued that questions of projectibility are to be understood as a variety of questions about the ways a given sample is random. Various examples are considered, including cases when ‘grue’ (as opposed to 'green') should be projected, and some remarks are offered on what is meant when it is claimed that a sample is random (in ways relevant to inductive support) and how such randomness is determined. The view presented helps to make clear the relation between such apparently non-projectible predicates as 'grue' and the concept of being examined.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 43 , Issue 3 , September 1976 , pp. 363 - 377
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

An earlier version of portions of this paper were presented at the Pacific Division meetings of the APA in March of 1974. There I profitted greatly from the criticism of Paul Teller. John Vickers is responsible for my interest in projection and much that I want to say about it. He is, of course, not responsible for the form my ideas take here.

References

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