Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-fvjsw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T10:03:22.130Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

On Theory-Change and Meaning-Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Michael E. Levin*
Affiliation:
The City College of the City University of New York

Abstract

I argue against the currently popular view that a radical change in theory affects the meaning of theoretical terms, and hence render pre- and post-shift theories incomparable. I first show how to pose the meaning-change issue without appeal to meanings reified. I contend that arguments against theory-neutral observation languages are faulty, but that even if they were sound, there are semantic devices that allow a theory to refer to the factual basis of a competitor. This suggests a picture of science as the accumulation of truths, with each successive stage being more stable.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1979

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable