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Particulars, Universals and Verification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Bruce Waters
Bruce Waters*
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University
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Abstract

If the truth of a given sentence, ‘P’ depends upon a certain non-linguistic fact, P then, how is the P without inverted commas involved in the statement, “ ‘P’ is true when P“? How is ‘P’ related to P? My answer suggests that any discussion of these questions leads inevitably to the ancient problem of particulars and universals.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , January 1940, pp. 81 - 91
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1940

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References

Notes

1 Cf. Susan L. Stebbing: “Constructions.” Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, New Series, Vol. XXXIV, p. 22.

2 See A. J. Ayer: “On Particulars and Universals.” Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, New Series, Vol. XXXIV, p. 53.

2 See L. S. Stebbing: “A Modern Introduction to Logic,” p. 159.

4 Cf. A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic, p. 75.

5 Cf. W. Kneale: “The Objects of Acquaintance.” Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, New Series, Vol. XXXIV, p. 189.

6 Bertrand Russell: The Problems of Philosophy, p. 213.

7 C. A. Mace: “Physicalism.” Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, New Series, Vol. XXXVII, p. 27.

8 Cf. A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic, p. 127.

9 Cf. C. I. Lewis: Mind and the World-Order, pp. 39, 46, 52 and passim.

10 Cf. A. J. Ayer: “Verification and Experience.” Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, New Series, Vol. XXXVII, p. 156.

11 See R. Carnap: Unity of Science, p. 83, italics mine.

12 Cf. Bertrand Russell: “On Verification.” Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, New Series, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 8.

13 C. I. Lewis: Op. cit., p. 73.

14 See R. Carnap: Unity of Science, pp. 57-65.

15 Of course we do not escape our sensations when, e.g., we read a thermometer. When the reading shows a certain number, it is always a color-patch as well as a number. But color blind persons could all agree on the reading, regardless of how the color of the numerical sign appeared to them.

16 I. M. Copilowish: “Border-Line Cases, Vagueness, and Ambiguity.” Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 184.

17 Evander Bradley McGilvary: “Relations in General and Universals in Particular I.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, p. 13.

18 Cf. I. M. Copilowish: Loc. cit., p. 182.

19 Cf. Rudolf Carnap: “Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science.” International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 50-51.

20 By ‘verifiable,‘ I do not intend “absolutely verifiable.“

21 C. I. Lewis: Op. cit., p. 80, his italics.

22 See Bertrand Russell: “On Verification.” Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, New Series, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 19.