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Partition-Theorems for Causal Decision Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jordan Howard Sobel
Jordan Howard Sobel*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Toronto
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Abstract

Two partition-theorems are proved for a particular causal decision theory. One is restricted to a certain kind of partition of circumstances, and analyzes the utility of an option in terms of its utilities in conjunction with circumstances in this partition. The other analyzes an option's utility in terms of its utilities conditional on circumstances and is quite unrestricted. While the first form seems more useful for applications, the second form may be of theoretical importance in foundational exercises. Comparisons are made with theorems of Richard Jeffrey, Brad Armendt, and Peter Fishburn.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 56 , Issue 1 , March 1989, pp. 70 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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