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Postulates and Meaning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Edward H. Madden
Affiliation:
San Jose State College
Murray J. Kiteley
Affiliation:
San Jose State College

Abstract

Most philosophers of science nowadays hold a network or postulational view of the meaning of theoretical words. However, there are many nuances to this view, and after explicitly separating them, we show what we take to be wrong with each one. While we reject the postulational view we do not defend its traditional alternatives either; rather we show the pointlessness of insisting on a single source for the meaning of theoretical words. We also point out the shortcomings of Carnap's newest meaning criterion which depends upon a network view. But, again, we suggest not only that this new rendition of the criterion is faulty but also that there is something misguided about any search at all for such a criterion.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1962

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