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Postulates of Rational Preference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Alex C. Michalos
Alex C. Michalos*
Affiliation:
University of Guelph, Ontario
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Abstract

The postulates of rational preference suggested by Von Neumann and Morgenstern have been defended as descriptive or empirical generalizations and as normative principles. It is argued that the postulates are inaccurate empirical generalizations and unacceptable normative principles.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 1967, pp. 18 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1967

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References

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