Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T11:30:15.305Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Pragmatic Aspects of Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Theodore Mischel*
Affiliation:
Colgate University

Abstract

How can reasons explain actions? What is the force of “because” in “He did this because...” followed by a statement of the agent's intentions? The answer involves some concept of what can count as explanation, and the history of science indicates that the acceptability of explanations depends, in part, on a scientific community which has decided to pursue its inquiries in one direction rather than another. The first part of this paper examines this pragmatic aspect of explanations; the second part draws on this examination in the hope of elucidating the way reasons explain actions. The possibility of eliminating our ordinary, “purposive,” explanations of actions in favor of some “mechanistic,” neuro-physiological, account is then considered.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1966 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable