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Reference Invariance and Truthlikeness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Ilkka Niiniluoto
Ilkka Niiniluoto*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, P.O. Box 24 (Unioninkatu 40), University of Helsinki, Helsinki 00014, Finland.
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Abstract

A holistic account of the meaning of theoretical terms leads scientific realism into serious troubles. Alternative methods of reference fixing are needed by a realist who wishes to show how reference invariance is possible in spite of meaning variance. This paper argues that the similarity theory of truthlikeness and approximate truth, developed by logicians since the mid 1970s, helps to make precise the idea of charitable theoretical reference. Comparisons to the recent proposals by Kitcher and Psillos are given. This argument helps to undermine the scepticist meta-induction about theories, and thereby to reevaluate Laudan's alleged confutation of scientific realism.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , December 1997, pp. 546 - 554
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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