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Representation and the Imperfect Ideal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Charles Wallis*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, 315 Dewey Hall, Rochester, NY 14627–0078, USA.

Abstract

This paper examines the nomic covariationist strategy of using idealization to define representation. While the literature has focused upon the possibility of defining ideal conditions for perception, I argue that nomic covariationist appeals to idealization are pseudoscientific and contrary to a foundational and empirically well-supported methodological presupposition in cognitive science. Moreover, one major figure in this camp fails to come to grips with its role and its problems in mainstream science. Thus he forwards a false dichotomy of the sciences and treats idealization as a blank check written by scientists on an unknown bank. Finally, I consider and reject alternative formulations of the nomic covariationist's idealization strategy.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1994

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