Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T05:59:16.120Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Supervenience and Computational Explanation in Vision Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Peter Morton*
Affiliation:
Department of Humanities, Mount Royal College

Abstract

According to Marr's theory of vision, computational processes of early vision rely for their success on certain “natural constraints” in the physical environment. I examine the implications of this feature of Marr's theory for the question whether psychological states supervene on neural states. It is reasonable to hold that Marr's theory is nonindividualistic in that, given the role of natural constraints, distinct computational theories of the same neural processes may be justified in different environments. But to avoid trivializing computational explanations, theories must respect methodological solipsism in the sense that within a theory there cannot be differences in content without a corresponding difference in neural states.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable