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Tense and Indeterminateness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Simon Saunders*
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Sub-faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 10 Merton St., Oxford OX1 4JJ, England.

Extract

Is tense real and objective? Can the fact that something is past, say, be wholly objective, consistent with modern physics? I believe that it can. But some hold that for tense to be real, then a certain ontological doctrine must also hold. There must be a fact of the matter as to what really, truly, exists at each time. For example, it is held that only what is now really exists. This is the doctrine of presentism. Alternatively, that only what is now or past really exists; following Savitt, I shall call this possibilism. But on either view there is a problem with special relativity.

Information

Type
Philosophy of Physics and Chemistry
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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