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Theoretical Terms and Partial Definitions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

John A. Winnie
John A. Winnie*
Affiliation:
University of Minnesota
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Abstract

The problem of the interpretation of theoretical terms is outlined, and some difficulties connected with the distinction between partial definitions and empirical postulates are discussed. A reconstruction is sketched which is intended to explicate the ‘definitional’ character of partial definitions. Finally, some implications for the methodology of theory construction are indicated.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , October 1965, pp. 324 - 328
Copyright
Copyright © 1965 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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[4] Hempel, C., Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science.Google Scholar
[5] Maxwell, G., “Meaning Postulates in Scientific Theories,” in Feigl & Maxwell, Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science.Google Scholar
[6] Suppes, P., Introduction to Logic.Google Scholar