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Traces of Things Past

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

John Heil*
Affiliation:
Brown University

Abstract

This paper consists of two parts. In Part I, an attempt to get around certain well-known criticisms of the trace theory of memory is discussed. Part II consists of an account of the so-called “logical” notion of a memory trace.

Trace theories are sometimes thought to be empirical hypotheses about the functioning of memory. That this is not the case, that trace theories are in fact philosophical theories, is shown, I believe, in the arguments which follow. If this is so, one may well wonder about psychologists' insistence that any empirical theory of memory must involve the postulation of traces (or trace-like entities: engrams, schemata, etc.).

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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