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What Revisions Does Bootstrap Testing Need?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jan M. Żytkow
Jan M. Żytkow*
Affiliation:
Computer Science Department, Wichita State University and the University of Warsaw
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Extract

Clark Glymour (1980) defined bootstrap-confirmation as a three-place relation: “Evidence E bootstrap confirms hypothesis H with respect to theory T.“ By an ingenious choice of examples, David Christensen (1983) has shown that Glymour's definition is satisfied in a class of cases in which confirmation seems to be highly counterintuitive. Responding to Christensen's criticism, Glymour (1983) revised his 1980 definition of bootstrap confirmation, by introducing an additional condition that rules out Christensen's counterexamples.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 53 , Issue 1 , March 1986, pp. 101 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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Footnotes

†

I am very grateful to Clark Glymour, Herbert Simon, and to an anonymous referee for many valuable suggestions that helped me in making a considerable number of improvements to this paper.

References

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