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Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce's Argument for Probabilism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

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Abstract

In this article, I explain how a variant of David Miller's argument concerning the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's notion of the accuracy of “estimates of numerical truth-values” (i.e., Joycean credences). This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences (understood as “estimates of numerical truth-values” in Joyce's sense) should obey the probability calculus.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association
Figure 0

Table 1Canonical Example of the Language Dependence of the Accuracy of Predictions

Figure 1

Table 2The Credence Function (B) of Our Simple Incoherent Agent (S)

Figure 2

Table 3An Example of the Language Dependence of Joycean Brier Domination