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Against Positing Central Systems in the Mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Don Ross
Don Ross*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario
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Abstract

This paper is concerned with a recent argument of Jerry Fodor's to the effect that the frame problem in artificial intelligence is in principle insoluble. Fodor's argument is based on his contention that the mind is divided between encapsulated modular systems for information processing and ‘central systems’ for non-demonstrative inference. I argue that positing central systems is methodologically unsound, and in fact involves a muddle that bears a strong family resemblance to the basic error in dualism. I therefore conclude that Fodor's position on the frame problem should be rejected.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , June 1990, pp. 297 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Bruce Freed, Chantale LaCasse, Ausonio Marras and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant #453-88-0279).

References

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