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Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Thomas Weston*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, San Diego State University
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, College of Arts and Letters, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA 92182-0303, USA.

Abstract

This paper describes a theory of accuracy or approximate truth and applies it to problems in the realist interpretation of scientific theories. It argues not only that realism requires approximate truth, but that an adequate theory of approximation also presupposes some elements of a realist interpretation of theories.

The paper distinguishes approximate truth from vagueness, probability and verisimilitude, and applies it to problems of confirmation and deduction from inaccurate premises. Basic results are cited, but details appear elsewhere. Objections are surveyed, including arguments by Miller, Laymon, and Laudan. Comparison is made with Niiniluoto's theory of verisimilitude, and the utility of his theory for realism assessed.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1992

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