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Are Realism and Instrumentalism Methodologically Indifferent?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Robin Findlay Hendry*
Affiliation:
University of Durham
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Durham, Durham, United Kingdom, DH1 3HN; email: R.F.Hendry@durham.ac.uk.

Abstract

Arthur Fine and André Kukla have argued that realism and instrumentalism are indifferent with respect to scientific practice. I argue that this claim is ambiguous. One interpretation is that for any practice, the fact that that practice yields predictively successful theories is evidentially indifferent between scientific realism and instrumentalism. On the second construal, the claim is that for any practice, adoption of that practice by a scientist is indifferent between their being a realist or instrumentalist. I argue that there are no good arguments for the indifference claim under the second interpretation, and good reasons to think that it is false.

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