Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-12T16:57:53.635Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Are Statistical Explanations Possible?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Lorenz Krüger
Lorenz Krüger*
Affiliation:
Universität Bielefeld, Germany
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The intuitive notion of a statistical explanation has been explicated in different ways; recently it has even been claimed that there are no statistical explanations at all. In an attempt to clarify the disputed issue, the approaches adopted by Hempel, by Jeffrey, Salmon and Greeno, and by Stegmüller are analyzed critically, as far as they are concerned with the explanation of particular events. A solution of the controversy is proposed on the basis of a concept of explanation which refers essentially to a causal analysis of the explanandum. The possibility of statistical explanations, then, becomes contingent upon the existence of indeterministic causation. In conclusion, therefore, a conception of causality is sketched which shows that indeterminism and causal connection are compatible, at least from an epistemological point of view, so that statistical explanation can be seen to represent a specific and possibly irreducible scientific activity.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 43 , Issue 1 , March 1976, pp. 129 - 146
Copyright
Copyright © 1976 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

†

This article was originally stimulated by Professor C. G. Hempel; an early version of this paper was read in his seminar. I am grateful to him for several discussions and many valuable suggestions which helped to improve upon preliminary drafts of this paper. Discussions in the philosophy colloquia of Columbia University and the University of Waterloo helped me to see some of its aspects, including critical points, more clearly.

References

Anscombe, G. E. M. Causality and Determination, An Inaugural Lecture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.Google Scholar
Cohen, R. S. and Buck, R., eds. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 8. Dordrecht: Reidel. 1971.Google Scholar
Collingwood, R. G. “On the So-called Idea of Causation,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 38 (1937–38): 85–112.10.1093/aristotelian/38.1.85CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collins, A. W. “The Use of Statistics in Explanation,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 17 (1966): 127–140.10.1093/bjps/17.2.127CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collins, A. W. “Explanation and Causality,” Mind 75 (1966): 482–500.10.1093/mind/LXXV.300.482CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hempel, C. G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: Free Press, 1965.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. “Deductive—Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation.” In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, III. Edited by Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.Google Scholar
Hempel, C. G. “Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, 35 (1968): 116–133.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hempel, C. G. “Explanation in Science and in History.” In Frontiers of Science and Philosophy. Edited by Colodny, R. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962.Google Scholar
Hume, D. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. “Causation.” Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973): 556–567.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Locke, J. Essay Concerning Human Understanding.Google Scholar
Nagel, E. The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Salmon, W. C., ed. Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970.Google Scholar
Sklar, L. “Statistical Explanation and Ergodic Theory.” Philosophy of Science, 40 (1973): 194–212.10.1086/288515CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stegmüller, W. Personelle und Statistische Wahrscheinlichkeit, 2. Halbband. Heidelberg, 1973.CrossRefGoogle Scholar