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Arrow's Proof and the Logic of Preference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Frederic Schick*
Affiliation:
Rutgers University

Abstract

This paper is a critique of Kenneth Arrow's thesis concerning the logical impossibility of a constitution. I argue that one of the premises of Arrow's proof, that of the transitivity of indifference, is untenable. Several concepts of preference are introduced and counter-instances are offered to the transitivity of indifference defined along the standard lines in terms of these concepts. Alternate analyses of indifference in terms of preference are considered, and it is shown that these do not serve Arrow's purposes either. Finally, it is argued that in the single special case in which indifference could plausibly be held to be transitive, Arrow's thesis is innocuous.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1969 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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