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Can the Bundle Theory Save Substantivalism from the Hole Argument?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Glenn Parsons
Affiliation:
University of Alberta
Patrick McGivern*
Affiliation:
University of Alberta
*
†Send requests for reprints to Glenn Parsons, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2E5, Canada; email: gparsons@ualberta.ca.

Abstract

One of the most serious theoretical obstacles to contemporary spacetime substantivalism is Earman and Norton's hole argument. We argue that applying the bundle theory of substance to spacetime points allows spacetime substantivalists to escape the conclusion of this argument. Some philosophers have claimed that the bundle theory cannot be applied to substantival spacetime in this way due to problems in individuating spacetime points in symmetrical spacetimes. We demonstrate that it is possible to overcome these difficulties if spatiotemporal properties are viewed as tropes rather than universals.

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