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Capacities, Universality, and Singularity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stuart S. Glennan
Stuart S. Glennan*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Butler University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, 4600 Sunset Ave., Butler University, Indianapolis, IN 46208.
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Abstract

In this paper I criticize Cartwright's analysis of capacities and offer an alternative analysis. I argue that Cartwright's attempt to connect capacities to her condition CC fails because individuals can exercise capacities only in certain contexts. My own analysis emphasizes three features of capacities: 1) Capacities belong to individuals; 2) Capacities are typically not metaphysically fundamental properties of individuals, but can be explained by referring to structural properties of individuals; and 3) Laws are best understood as ascriptions of capacities.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 4 , December 1997 , pp. 605 - 626
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to Joe Bessie, Paul Humphreys, Ben Rogers, Bill Vallicella, Jim Woodward and an anonymous referee for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This paper was written while I attended an NEH Seminar for College Teachers. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Endowment.

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