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Causation, Agency, and Independence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Daniel M. Hausman*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Madison
*
†Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: dhausman@macc.wisc.edu.

Abstract

This paper explores versions of agency or manipulability theories of causation and argues that they are unacceptable both for the well-known reasons of their anthropomorphism, limited scope, and circularity and because they are subsumed by an alternative “independence” theory of causation, which is free of these difficulties.

Information

Type
Symposium: Causal Asymmetry, Intervention, and Chance
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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