Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-7pwfn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-15T06:50:39.087Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Paul Weirich*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Rochester

Abstract

The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend these counter-examples against charges that the probabilities they involve are illegitimate.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable