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Construction by Reduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jeffry L. Ramsey
Jeffry L. Ramsey*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Oregon State University
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Abstract

Scientists employ a variety of procedures to eliminate degrees of freedom from computationally and/or analytically intractable equations. In the process, they often construct new models and discover new concepts, laws and functional relations. 1 argue these procedures embody a central notion of reduction, namely, the containment of one structure within another. However, their inclusion in the philosophical concept of reduction necessitates a reevaluation of many standard assumptions about the ontological, epistemological and functional features of a reduction. On the basis of the reevaluation, 1 advocate a continuum of reduction which proceeds from the eliminative to the constructive. The metaphysical aspects of theory use in constructive reductions are sketched.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 62 , Issue 1 , March 1995, pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1995

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Footnotes

†

Previous versions of this paper were read to the Department of Philosophy at Rice University and to the members of Studies of Science and Technology Program at the University of Minnesota. I am deeply indebted to members of both audiences for many critical and constructive comments. Thanks also to Dan Rothbart, who provided insightful and illuminating comments on this version of the paper. Later stages of this work were supported by a post-doctoral fellowship in the SST program at the University of Minnesota.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331–3902, USA.

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