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Content, Causal Powers, and Context

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Keith Butler
Keith Butler*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Washington University
*
‡Send requests for reprints to the author, Department of Philosophy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, 63130-4899, USA.
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Abstract

Owens (1993) argues that one cannot accept the anti-individualistic conclusions of arguments inspired by Twin Earth thought experiments and still maintain that folk psychological states causally explain behavior. Saidel (1994) has argued that Owens' argument illegitimately individuates the contents of folk psychological states widely and causal powers narrowly. He suggests that causal powers may well be wide, and that the conditions that militate in favor of wide content also militate in favor of wide causal powers; mutatis mutandis for narrow content and narrow causal powers. I argue that these suggestions are in error, and hence that Saidel's criticism is ineffective. Owens' original point is therefore likely to stand.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 1 , March 1996, pp. 105 - 114
Copyright
Copyright © 1996 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Thanks to Philip Kitcher and an anonymous reviewer for suggestions. This work was completed under a grant and sabbatical leave, both awarded by the Dean of Faculty of Washington University.

References

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