Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-wxvwp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-14T10:58:44.052Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Darwin's Long and Short Arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Matti Sintonen
Matti Sintonen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The Academy of Finland
Get accessRights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Doren Recker has criticized the prevailing accounts of Darwin's argument for the theory of natural selection in the Origin of Species. In this note I argue that Recker fails to distinguish between a deductive short argument for the principle of natural selection, and a non-deductive, long argument which aims at establishing that the principle has explanatory power in the various domains of application. I shall try to show that the semantic view of theories, especially in its structuralist form, makes it easy to distinguish between the two arguments and to explain how Darwin's long argument counts as one argument. I also raise a question about Recker's views on Darwin's mid-Victorian background, arguing that Newton's First Rule of Reasoning was not just a constraint on hypotheses involving unobservables, but a general request to keep conjecture and certainty apart.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 4 , December 1990, pp. 677 - 689
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

Footnotes

†

This discussion was written during my stay as a Fulbright Fellow in the Boston Center for the Philosophy and History of Science. I wish to thank the Finland-U.S. Educational Exchange Commission for financial support, and Boston University for its hospitality during the stay. I also want to thank two anonymous reviewers for Philosophy of Science for detailed criticisms and constructive suggestions.

References

Balzer, W., Ulises Moulines, C., and Sneed, J. D. (1986), “The Structure of Empirical Science”, in Barcan Marcus et al. (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VII. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 291–306.Google Scholar
Beatty, J. (1980). “What's Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory?”, in P. D. Asquith and R. N. Giere (eds.), PSA 1980, vol. 2. East Lansing, Mich.: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 379–426.Google Scholar
Darwin, C. (1974). “Autobiography”, in C. Darwin and T. H. Huxley, Autobiographies. Edited by de Beer, Gavin. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Darwin, C. (1896), The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, vols. I and II. Ed. by Darwin, F. New York: D. Appleton and Company.Google Scholar
Darwin, C. (1960), “Darwin's Notebook on Transmutation of Species, Parts II and III”, Bulletin of the British Museum (Natural History), Historical Series, Vol. 2, nos. 3 and 4. Ed. by de Beer, Gavin. Dorking: Bartholomew Press.Google Scholar
Darwin, C. (1964), On the Origin of Species. A Facsimile of the First Edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Descartes, R. (1983), Principles of Philosophy. Translated by Miller, V. R. and Miller, R. P. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
Feyerabend, P. (1970), “Classical Empiricism”, in R. E. Butts and J. W. Davis (eds.), The Methodological Heritage of Newton. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 150–170.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ghiselin, M. (1984), The Triumph of the Darwinian Method. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Hanson, N. R. (1970), “Hypotheses Fingo”, in R. E. Butts and J. W. Davis (eds.), The Methodological Heritage of Newton. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 14–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitcher, P. (1985), “Darwin's Achievement”, in N. Rescher (ed.), Reason and Rationality in Natural Science. Lantham, MD: University Press of America, pp. 127–189.Google Scholar
Lloyd, E. (1983), “The Nature of Darwin's Support for the Theory of Natural Selection”, Philosophy of Science 50: 112–129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newton, I. (1958), Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy and Related Documents. Ed. Cohen, I. B. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Recker, D. A. (1987), “The Structure of Darwin's Argument Strategy in the Origin of Species”, Philosophy of Science 54: 147–175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ruse, M. (1973), The Philosophy of Biology. London: Hutchinson.Google Scholar
Ruse, M. (1975), “Charles Darwin's Theory of Evolution: An Analysis”, Journal of the History of Biology 8: 219–241.Google ScholarPubMed
Sintonen, M. (1984), “On the Logic of Why-Questions”, in P. D. Asquith and P. Kitcher (eds.), PSA 1984, Vol. I. East Lansing, Mich.: The Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 168–176.Google Scholar
Sintonen, M. (1989, “Explanation: In Search of the Rationale”, in P. Kitcher and W. C. Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Sneed, J. D. (1976), “Philosophical Problems in the Empirical Science of Science: A Formal Approach”, Erkenntnis 10: 115–146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stegmüller, W. (1979), The Structuralist View of Theories. A Possible Analogue of the Bourbaki Programme in Physical Science. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
Thagard, P. (1978), “The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice”, The Journal of Philosophy 75: 76–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, M. B. (1970), “Deducing the Consequences of Evolution: A Mathematical Model”, Journal of Theoretical Biology 29: 343–385.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed