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Decision Theory in Light of Newcomb's Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Paul Horwich*
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Abstract

Should we act only for the sake of what we might bring about (causal decision theory); or is it enough for a decent motive that our action is highly correlated with something desirable (evidential decision theory)? The conflict between these points of view is embodied in Newcomb's problem. It is argued here that intuitive evidence from familiar decision contexts does not enable us to settle the issue, since the two theories dictate the same results in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, there are several reasons to reject the causal approach: (1) its relative complexity; (2) its commitment to the existence of situations in which every possible act would be irrational; (3) its incorporation of an arbitrary time bias; and (4) its implicit distinction between what ought to be done and what ought to be hoped for.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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