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Deductive Scientific Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Robert Ackermann
Robert Ackermann*
Affiliation:
Washington University
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Extract

In this paper, I shall examine attempts to furnish formal models for deductive scientific explanation. All such attempts have had certain defects. The most serious of these defects is to be found in the fact that the extant models seem to be formally restrictive in ways that do not allow any obvious generalization of their conditions which will encompass the full range of all those scientific explanations which must be considered plausible candidates for translation into deductive models.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 1965, pp. 155 - 167
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1965

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References

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