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Determinism, Realism, and Probability in Evolutionary Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Marcel Weber
Marcel Weber*
Affiliation:
Universität Hannover
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, Zentrale Einrichtung für Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsethik, Universität Hannover, Oeltzenstrasse 9, 30169 Hannover, Germany; email: weber@ww.uni-hannover.de.
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Abstract

Recent discussion of the statistical character of evolutionary theory has centered around two positions: (1) Determinism combined with the claim that the statistical character is eliminable, a subjective interpretation of probability, and instrumentalism; (2) Indeterminism combined with the claim that the statistical character is ineliminable, a propensity interpretation of probability, and realism. I point out some internal problems in these positions and show that the relationship between determinism, eliminability, realism, and the interpretation of probability is more complex than previously assumed in this debate. Furthermore, I take some initial steps towards a more adequate account of the statistical character of evolutionary theory.

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Footnotes

‡

I wish to thank Roberta Millstein, Robert Brandon, Elliott Sober, and Paul Hoyningen-Huene for helpful suggestions.

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