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Diachronic Rationality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Patrick Maher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 105 Gregory Hall, 810 South Wright St., Urbana, IL 61801, USA.

Abstract

This is an essay in the Bayesian theory of how opinions should be revised over time. It begins with a discussion of the principle that van Fraassen has dubbed “Reflection”. This principle is not a requirement of rationality; a diachronic Dutch argument, that purports to show the contrary, is fallacious. But under suitable conditions, it is irrational to actually implement shifts in probability that violate Reflection. Conditionalization and probability kinematics are special cases of the principle not to implement shifts that violate Reflection; hence these principles are also requirements of rationality under suitable conditions, though not universal requirements of rationality.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1992

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