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Discussion: A Note on Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Gregory Currie
Gregory Currie*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Otago
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Abstract

In a recent article (1980) G. H. Merrill has defended realism against an argument devised by Hilary Putnam. My first aim is to show that Merrill's defence is inadequate. I shall also argue that the proper conclusion of Putnam's argument is somewhat different from the conclusion Putnam himself offers.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , June 1982, pp. 263 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to the referees of this Journal for their comments.

References

REFERENCES

Merrill, G. H. (1980), ‘The Model-Theoretic Argument against Realism', Philosophy of Science 47: 69–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H. (1977), ‘Realism and Reason', in Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978: 123–40.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. (1980), ‘Models and Reality', Journal of Symbolic Logic 45: 464–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar