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Discussion: Are Methodological Rules Hypothetical Imperatives?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

David B. Resnik
David B. Resnik*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Wyoming
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Abstract

This discussion adjudicates a dispute between Larry Laudan and Gerald Doppelt over the nature of methodological rules. Laudan holds that all methodological rules are hypothetical imperatives, while Doppelt argues that a subset of those rules, basic methodological standards, are not hypothetical imperatives. I argue that neither writer offers a satisfactory account of methodological rules and that their reliance on the hypothetical/nonhypothetical distinction does not advance our understanding of methodological rules. I propose that we dispense with this dubious distinction and develop an alternative account of scientific norms.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , September 1992, pp. 498 - 507
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I thank Ed Sherline, Jim Martin, Michael Resnik and an anonymous reviewer for Philosophy of Science for helpful discussion and comments.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Box 3392, University Station, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071, USA.

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