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Discussion: Eliminativism and Methodological Individualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Harold Kincaid*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Alabama at Birmingham

Abstract

Tuomela (this issue, pp. 96–103) raises several objections to the analysis and critique of methodological individualism in my (1986). In what follows I reply to those criticisms, arguing, among other things, that: (1) the alleged reductions provided by Tuomela and others fail, because they either presuppose rather than eliminate social predicates or do not avoid the problem of multiple realizations; (2) supervenience does not guarantee that the social sciences are reducible, because merely describing supervenieence bases leaves numerous questions unanswered, and (3) the eliminativism that Tuomela favors verges on being self-refuting and is highly implausible short of a detailed empirical critique of the social sciences, something Tuomela does not provide and something there is little reason to think can be provided.

Information

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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