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Discussion: Methodological Individualism and Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Raimo Tuomela
Raimo Tuomela*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Helsinki
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Abstract

This critical note concerns Harold Kincaid's “Reduction, Explanation and Empiricism” (this journal, December 1986). Kincaid criticizes methodological individualism on several grounds. The present note argues that Kincaid fails at least in his attempt to show that it is false that individualistic theory suffices to fully explain social phenomena. Kincaid's main reason for claiming that individualistic theory is insufficient is that it cannot adequately explain social kinds. The present note contends that an individualist can suitably reinterpret the social talk in question and so succeed in explaining social phenomena. In some cases his explanatory factors will presumably be direct counterparts to the holist's explanatory social kinds, whereas in some other cases they may not be—arguably need not be.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , March 1990, pp. 133 - 140
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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