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Discussion: Reduction, Elimination, and Firewalking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Colin Cheyne
Colin Cheyne*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Otago
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Abstract

Schwartz (1991) argues that the worry that successful reduction would eliminate rather than conserve the mental is a needless worry. He examines cases of reduction from the natural sciences and claims that if reduction of the mental is like any of those cases then it would not be a case of elimination. I discuss other cases of scientific reduction which do involve elimination. Schwartz has not shown that reduction of the mental could not be like such cases, so his argument is not sufficient to dispel the worry of elimination.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 60 , Issue 2 , June 1993, pp. 349 - 357
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1993

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful for Alan Musgrave's helpful comments and encouragement.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand.

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