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Discussion: The Unanimity Theory and Probabilistic Sufficiency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

John W. Carroll*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, New York University

Abstract

The unanimity theory is an account of property-level causation requiring that causes raise the probability of their effects in specified test situations. Richard Otte (1981) and others have presented counterexamples in which one property is probabilistically sufficient for at least one other property. Given the continuing discussion (e.g., Cartwright 1989; Cartwright and Dupré 1988; Eells 1988a,b), many apparently think that these problems are minor. By considering the impact of Otte's cases on recent versions of the theory, by raising several new examples, and by criticizing natural replies, I argue that the problems for the unanimity theory are severe.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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