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Discussion: Thoughts on Maher's Predictivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Eric Barnes
Eric Barnes*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University
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Abstract

Predictivism asserts that where evidence E confirms theory T, E provides stronger support for T when E is predicted on the basis of T and then confirmed than when E is known before T's construction and ‘used’, in some sense, in the construction of T. Among the most interesting attempts to argue that predictivism is a true thesis (under certain conditions) is that of Patrick Maher (1988, 1990, 1993). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of predictivism using Maher's analysis as a starting point. I briefly summarize Maher's primary argument and expand upon it; I explore related issues pertaining to the causal structure of empirical domains and the logic of discovery.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 3 , September 1996, pp. 401 - 410
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a summer seminar stipend that supported research culminating in this paper, and grateful to Larry Laudan for teaching an excellent seminar. For comments and criticisms on the arguments developed in this paper I am grateful to Doug Ehring, Mark Heller, Patrick Maher, Alastair Norcross, and two anonymous Philosophy of Science referees.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275.

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