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Dispositions Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

William W. Rozeboom
William W. Rozeboom*
Affiliation:
University of Alberta
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Abstract

Subjunctive conditionals have their uses, but constituting the meaning of dispositional predicates is not one of them. More germane is the analysis of dispositions in terms of “bases”—except that past efforts to maintain an ontic gap between dispositions and their bases, while not wholly misguided, have failed to appreciate the semantic birthright of dispositional concepts as a species of theoretical construct in primitive science.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 40 , Issue 1 , March 1973, pp. 59 - 74
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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