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Duhem's Problem, the Bayesian Way, and Error Statistics, or “What's Belief Got to Do with It?”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Deborah G. Mayo*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126.

Abstract

I argue that the Bayesian Way of reconstructing Duhem's problem fails to advance a solution to the problem of which of a group of hypotheses ought to be rejected or “blamed” when experiment disagrees with prediction. But scientists do regularly tackle and often enough solve Duhemian problems. When they do, they employ a logic and methodology which may be called error statistics. I discuss the key properties of this approach which enable it to split off the task of testing auxiliary hypotheses from that of appraising a primary hypothesis. By discriminating patterns of error, this approach can at least block, if not also severely test, attempted explanations of an anomaly. I illustrate how this approach directs progress with Duhemian problems and explains how scientists actually grapple with them.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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