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Explanation, Causality, and Counterfactuals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Evan K. Jobe
Evan K. Jobe*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Texas Tech University
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to develop an adequate version of the D-N theory of explanation for particular events and to show how the resulting D-N model can be used as a tool in articulating a regularity theory of causation and an analysis of the truth conditions for counterfactual conditionals. Starting with a basic model that is largely the product of other workers in this field, two new restrictions are formulated in order to construct a version of D-N explanation that does not yield the counterintuitive results that have plagued all earlier versions. An additional condition is then developed that is indispensable for utilizing the D-N model as a tool in formulating a regularity theory of causation. Finally, it is shown how a suitable model of potential D-N explanation facilitates the formulation of a theory of counterfactual conditionals.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 3 , September 1985, pp. 357 - 389
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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