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Feasible Inferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Christopher Cherniak*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy Tufts University

Abstract

A philosophically important but largely overlooked cognitive theory is examined, one that provides information on which inferences an agent will make from his beliefs. Such a theory of feasible inferences is indispensable in a complete cognitive psychology, in particular, for predicting the agent's actions on the basis of rationality conditions and attributed beliefs and desires. However, very little of the feasibility theory which applies to a typical human being can be shown a priori to apply to all agents. The logical competence required of a rational agent seems to have a cluster structure: it cannot be the case that an agent is able to make no inferences, but an agent can be unable to make any particular one.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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